On May 5, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed the most consequential revision to the periodic reporting framework in fifty-six years: amendments that would permit every public company currently filing quarterly reports on Form 10-Q to elect, instead, a single semiannual report on a new Form 10-S.¹ A company making the election would file two reports each year—one Form 10-S covering the first half of the fiscal year and one Form 10-K covering the full year—in place of the three quarterly reports and one annual report that have anchored American public-company disclosure since 1970.² The comment period closes on July 6, 2026.²
The proposal has been debated, almost exclusively, on two questions: whether quarterly reporting causes managerial short-termism, and whether its costs deter companies from going public. Those are legitimate questions, and this analysis addresses the evidence on both. But they are not the questions that should most concern institutional investors. The question that matters is narrower and more forensic: what, precisely, disappears when a quarter goes dark? The answer is not a press release. Companies that elect semiannual reporting will, in most cases, continue issuing quarterly earnings releases. What disappears is everything beneath the press release—the independent accountant's interim review, the management's discussion and analysis, the legal proceedings and risk factor updates, the internal control disclosures, the executive certifications, and the filed-document liability that disciplines all of them. The market will continue to receive numbers every ninety days. What it will receive less often is accountability.
This article examines the history that produced the quarterly report, the mechanics of what the Commission has proposed, the specific disclosure architecture that would be dismantled for electing companies, the empirical evidence on both sides of the frequency debate, and the adverse-selection dynamics that make an optional regime more dangerous than a mandatory one would be. It concludes with the specific demands institutional investors should press—first in comment letters before July 6, and then in engagement with any portfolio company that checks the box.
The quarterly report was not handed down with the federal securities laws. It was assembled, piece by piece, across decades of demonstrated informational failure. Annual reports on Form 10-K have been required since 1935, and current reports for specified material events since 1936.³ In 1946, the Commission began requiring certain companies to disclose quarterly revenue data, an experiment it abandoned in 1953.³ Two years later, it settled on a semiannual regime: Form 9-K, due forty-five days after the period, containing little more than abbreviated income statement line items—no detailed balance sheet, no statement of stockholders' equity, no statement of cash flows, and no narrative disclosure of any kind.³
The 9-K era lasted fifteen years. In October 1970, the Commission rescinded Form 9-K and adopted Form 10-Q, instituting the uniform quarterly cadence that has governed ever since.⁴ It would overstate the record to read simple causation into that calendar. But the calendar remains instructive: four months before the 10-Q's adoption, Penn Central collapsed into what was then the largest bankruptcy in American history—a real-time demonstration of how quickly a great enterprise could deteriorate under the era's thin and infrequent interim disclosure. The conglomerate boom and its accounting casualties had taught the same lesson at scale: too much could go wrong in the dark.
Nor did the 10-Q arrive fully formed. Each layer of the modern document was added after the prior version proved insufficient. The management's discussion and analysis matured through successive Commission disclosure overhauls after investors learned that financial statements without narrative context conceal as much as they reveal. Mandatory review of quarterly financial statements by the company's independent auditor was not imposed on all filers until the turn of the century, when the Commission acted amid a wave of earnings-management scandals. The certifications of the chief executive and chief financial officers arrived with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, written in the immediate aftermath of Enron and WorldCom. The modern 10-Q, in short, is a sedimentary record of investor losses. Every stratum marks a place where the previous disclosure regime failed.
The international context is more favorable to the Commission's proposal, and it deserves honest acknowledgment. The European Union mandated quarterly interim statements from 2004 until 2013, and the United Kingdom from 2007 until 2014; both retreated to semiannual minimums.⁵ Foreign private issuers listed in the United States have never been subject to the Form 10-Q regime at all, furnishing home-country interim reports instead. The proposal would, in that sense, converge the United States toward a global norm. But convergence arguments should be examined rather than assumed. The depth of American interim disclosure—not merely its frequency—has long been a structural advantage of the United States capital markets, one plausibly reflected in their liquidity and cost of capital. The relevant question is not whether other markets tolerate less. It is whether less would have served American investors through the corporate failures that the current architecture was built to expose.
The mechanics are deceptively simple. Any company that currently files Form 10-Q—regardless of size or filer status, and including business development companies—could elect semiannual reporting; foreign private issuers and registered investment companies, which do not file Form 10-Q, are outside the proposal's scope.⁶ ⁷ The election would be made annually, by checking a box on the cover page of Form 10-K (or, for newly public companies, on the relevant registration statement), and could not be changed mid-year.⁷ Quarterly reporting would remain the default for any company that does not affirmatively opt out.⁸
Form 10-S itself would be a credible document. It would require the same narrative disclosures and financial information as Form 10-Q, covering a six-month rather than three-month period: financial statements prepared in accordance with United States generally accepted accounting principles, reviewed (but not audited) by the company's independent accountant, tagged in Inline XBRL, and due forty or forty-five days after the period depending on filer status.⁹ ¹⁰ The proposal would also amend Regulation S-X so that semiannual filers' financial statements do not go stale under rules calibrated to a quarterly cycle.¹⁰
Even on the issuer side, however, the promised flexibility carries hidden costs. Under existing auditing standards, an accountant can provide the negative assurance that underwriters require in comfort letters only for periods covered by an interim review—which means a semiannual filer attempting a registered offering in the middle or back half of the year may find the capital markets calendar working against it, a complication the Commission has acknowledged by requesting comment on potential accommodations.¹⁰ ¹¹ Practitioners have likewise questioned whether the cost savings will approach what proponents advertise.⁵ The skepticism is well founded: the close, the controls, and the audit infrastructure must keep running regardless of how often the output is filed.
The Commission anticipates that the proposal would produce three categories of reporting companies: quarterly reporters, which continue as today; semiannual reporters, which file one Form 10-S and nothing in between; and hybrid reporters, which file one Form 10-S while voluntarily issuing earnings releases for the first and third quarters.⁶ Critically, the proposal leaves the regulatory treatment of earnings releases essentially untouched, beyond technical conforming amendments.¹² And the Commission itself has flagged the two questions on which the entire investor-protection analysis turns, soliciting comment on whether hybrid reporters' quarterly earnings releases should be required to be filed rather than furnished, and whether they should be subject to independent auditor review.⁶ The proposing release contains fifty-eight specific requests for comment, and the Commission disclosed that it considered alternatives ranging from mandatory semiannual reporting for all filers to limiting the option to smaller registrants.⁶ ¹³
The political provenance is no secret. President Trump called for the change on Truth Social on September 15, 2025, writing that six-month reporting would "save money, and allow managers to focus on properly running their companies," and contrasting American quarterly cadence with what he characterized as China's fifty-to-one-hundred-year management horizon.¹⁴ The comparison was inapt—Chinese listed companies face interim reporting requirements comparable to or stricter than those in the United States, including quarterly filings¹⁴—but the request was effective. SEC Chairman Paul Atkins confirmed within days that a proposal would follow, noting that foreign private issuers already report semiannually, and placed the project on the Commission's fast-track agenda as part of his stated goal to "make IPOs great again."¹⁵ ¹⁶ In a Financial Times column, Chairman Atkins framed the initiative as the Commission's decision to "remove its thumb from the scales" and let the market set reporting cadence.¹⁷ The idea itself is older: President Trump floated it in August 2018 during his first term, prompting the Commission under Chairman Jay Clayton to issue a formal request for comment that December—a request to which commenters from the investor community responded, in the main, by supporting the retention of quarterly reporting, after which the Commission let the matter rest.⁶ ¹⁸ The Long-Term Stock Exchange announced in September 2025, days before the President's post, that it would petition the Commission for the same relief.¹⁸
None of this provenance, standing alone, makes the proposal wrong. Rulemakings should be evaluated on their merits. The merits are examined below—and they are weaker than the proposal's momentum suggests.
The most common reassurance offered to investors runs as follows: nothing important will change, because companies will keep issuing quarterly earnings releases anyway. The United Kingdom's experience is cited in support—when the quarterly mandate was lifted there in 2014, fewer than one in ten companies had stopped issuing quarterly reports by the end of the following year.⁵ Major issuers have signaled the same instinct here; JPMorgan Chase's chief executive has indicated that his bank would likely continue updating investors every three months even if the rules relaxed, albeit with a slimmer package.¹⁷ Sullivan & Cromwell, advising issuers, expects many electing companies to continue quarterly releases to sustain analyst dialogue, preserve capital markets access, and open trading windows for buybacks and insider transactions.¹¹
This reassurance mistakes the press release for the filing. They are not the same instrument, and the differences between them are precisely where financial misreporting lives.
A quarterly earnings release is furnished to the Commission under Item 2.02 of Form 8-K rather than filed, a distinction with consequences: furnished material does not carry the liability that attaches to filed documents under Section 18 of the Exchange Act and is not automatically incorporated into registration statements.⁶ No independent accountant reviews it. It contains no management's discussion and analysis of liquidity, capital resources, or known trends and uncertainties. It contains no update on legal proceedings, no disclosure of material changes to risk factors, no report on changes in internal control over financial reporting, and no certifications from the chief executive officer and chief financial officer attesting to its fairness and to the state of the company's disclosure controls. It carries no standardized Inline XBRL tagging, which means it does not flow cleanly into the structured-data pipelines on which modern institutional screening depends. Its contents and emphasis are curated entirely by management, which is why earnings releases so often lead with adjusted metrics and leave the reconciliations for the back pages. A Form 10-Q, by contrast, carries all of these things—and its financial statements must be reviewed by the company's independent auditor under Rule 10-01(d) of Regulation S-X before the document can be filed.⁹ ¹⁰
The hybrid reporter, in other words, is not a company that has preserved quarterly disclosure. It is a company that has preserved quarterly publicity while shedding quarterly accountability. For two quarters of every year, the only interim financial information the market receives would be unreviewed, uncertified, selectively presented, and furnished rather than filed—interim reporting on the honor system. The Commission has effectively conceded the point by asking commenters whether hybrid reporters' releases should be filed and auditor-reviewed⁶—questions that would not need asking if the press release were an adequate substitute. And the concession runs deeper still: under the proposal, if a company voluntarily presents quarterly breakdowns within its Form 10-S financial statements, that information becomes subject to auditor review.¹² The same numbers, printed in a press release six weeks earlier, would have passed under no independent eyes at all. The reliability of interim information, on this design, depends not on the information but on the envelope.
Consider the arithmetic for a calendar-year large accelerated filer that elects semiannual reporting. Its Form 10-S, covering January through June, is due forty days after June 30—August 9. Its next filed periodic report is the Form 10-K, due sixty days after December 31—March 1. Between those dates lie 204 days during which the company files no periodic financial report of any kind. Under the current regime, the longest such interval—between the third-quarter Form 10-Q and the annual report—is 112 days. The proposal does not trim the market's statutory blind spot at the margin; it nearly doubles it.
The third quarter fares worst of all. Under semiannual reporting, third-quarter results never appear in any standalone filed document. They surface only inside full-year figures, roughly five months after the quarter closes, and even then without separate presentation: the proposal does not require a second-half breakout in the Form 10-K, though the Commission has asked whether it should.⁸ An investor wishing to isolate the third quarter of an electing company's year would be performing subtraction on annual statements the following March—for events that occurred the previous July.
The dark window is not merely an information delay. It is the silent re-basing of every monitoring mechanism that the securities laws key to the interim reporting period. Management's evaluation of the company's ability to continue as a going concern under ASC 205-40 attaches to the preparation of financial statements for each annual and interim reporting period; with one interim period instead of three, formal going-concern evaluations fall from four per year to two—a contraction of exactly the early-warning machinery whose erosion this firm documented in a prior analysis of vanishing going-concern opinions. Executive certifications under Sections 302 and 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act accompany each periodic report; they fall from four per year to two. The Commission understands what that implies: the proposing release itself asks whether less frequent certifications could allow material misstatements and control deficiencies to persist undetected for longer.¹⁹ Conclusions on the effectiveness of disclosure controls, and disclosure of material changes in internal control over financial reporting, re-base from the fiscal quarter to the six-month period.¹⁰ The independent auditor's interim reviews fall from three per year to one, which means that for two full quarters, no independent accountant examines the company's financial statements in any form until the year-end audit—an audit that arrives, for a transaction recorded in January, more than a year after the fact.
The insider trading implications deserve their own paragraph. Trading windows and Rule 10b5-1 plan triggers are conventionally anchored to the filing of Forms 10-Q; counsel are already advising that these instruments will need to be re-anchored to Form 10-S or to earnings releases if the proposal is adopted.¹⁰ Re-anchoring windows to unreviewed press releases is not a technical housekeeping matter. The economic logic is straightforward: the informational advantage of corporate insiders over outside investors grows with the interval between mandatory disclosures, and the empirical record—discussed below—confirms that longer reporting intervals widen information asymmetry. A regime in which insiders may trade against a market whose last filed, reviewed financial statements are six months stale is a regime that has quietly repriced the value of being an insider. The same rhythm governs the corporate side of the ledger: open-market repurchase programs are conventionally timed around the information cycle, which is among the practical reasons counsel expect even semiannual electors to keep publishing quarterly numbers in some form.¹¹
Finally, the forensic point that underlies all the others. Financial misreporting does not announce itself; it is forced into the open by deadlines. Every fraud must survive its next mandatory close—the next auditor review, the next certification, the next management's discussion and analysis in which known trends must be described without a material omission. Halving the number of mandatory closes doubles the maximum runway between examinations. No fraudster lobbied for this proposal, but it is difficult to design a reform more congenial to one.
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The intellectually serious case for the proposal rests on the short-termism hypothesis, and it has genuine academic support. Kraft, Vashishtha, and Venkatachalam, studying the transitions of American companies from annual to semiannual to quarterly reporting between 1950 and 1970, found that increased reporting frequency was associated with a decline in firm investment.²⁰ Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan supplied the theoretical mechanism, modeling how more frequent reporting can induce managers to favor projects with earlier payoffs.²¹ If quarterly reporting systematically starves long-horizon investment, the cost to the economy could dwarf any informational benefit to traders. These findings deserve to be taken seriously rather than waved away, and they explain why thoughtful people across several decades have found the semiannual idea attractive.
But the most direct natural experiment available—the United Kingdom, which mandated quarterly reporting in 2007 and removed the mandate in 2014—refused to cooperate with the hypothesis. Pozen, Nallareddy, and Rajgopal, in a study published by the CFA Institute Research Foundation, examined corporate investment behavior across both regulatory transitions and found that reporting frequency had no material impact on levels of corporate investment: companies forced into quarterly reporting did not cut investment, and companies released from the requirement did not raise it.²² What the mandate did change was the information environment. Analyst coverage of companies that began reporting quarterly rose materially—by 21.5 percent for mandatory switchers and 26.5 percent for voluntary adopters between 2007 and 2009—and the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts improved.²³ The frequency of reporting, on the best available evidence, does not govern how companies invest. It governs how well the market understands them.
The American historical record points the same direction on the informational question. Fu, Kraft, and Zhang, using hand-collected data on reporting frequency from 1951 to 1973—the very period in which the modern cadence was forged—found that higher reporting frequency reduced information asymmetry and lowered the cost of equity capital, results robust to mandatory frequency changes.²⁴ This is the finding the proposal must overcome and cannot: whatever quarterly reporting costs preparers, it has historically paid investors back through cheaper capital and narrower informational gaps between insiders and outsiders.
The short-termism argument also suffers from a targeting problem that two of its most prominent voices identified years ago. When Warren Buffett and Jamie Dimon wrote their much-cited 2018 op-ed condemning the "unhealthy focus on short-term profits at the expense of long-term strategy," their target was quarterly earnings-per-share guidance—the practice of promising Wall Street a number—and they were explicit that they did not oppose quarterly reporting itself, which they described as ensuring transparency.²⁵ The distinction is fatal to the proposal's logic, because the proposal regulates the wrong variable: it would reduce mandatory reporting while leaving guidance practices entirely untouched.¹² A company that today guides to quarterly earnings per share and reports quarterly could tomorrow guide to quarterly earnings per share and report semiannually. The pathology survives; only the audited record of it disappears.
As for the claim that quarterly reporting deters public listings, the head of financial reporting policy at the CFA Institute has noted the absence of empirical evidence that reducing disclosure produces more public companies, and has warned that optional cadences would make the peer comparisons on which fundamental analysis depends materially harder.²⁶ The decline in listed companies has many documented causes—the economics of private capital chief among them, a subject this firm has examined extensively. The 10-Q is not credibly one of them, and the United Kingdom's experience offers a quiet rebuttal of the burden narrative: when reporting quarterly became voluntary, the overwhelming majority of companies kept doing it.⁵ A burden that more than ninety percent of those relieved of it chose to continue bearing is not the thing keeping companies private.
The honest synthesis is this: the proposal's promised benefit rests on the weakest empirical leg of the debate, while its cost lands squarely on the strongest. The investment-myopia effect that semiannual reporting is supposed to cure failed to appear in the cleanest natural experiment ever run on the question. The information-asymmetry harm that semiannual reporting would inflict is among the most consistently documented relationships in the disclosure literature.
All of the foregoing analyzes the proposal as if its effects would fall uniformly. They will not, because the regime is optional—and optionality converts a disclosure rule into a sorting mechanism.
Ask which companies will rationally pay the price of checking the box. The price is real: probable analyst attrition, awkward questions from institutional holders, and the suspicion that attends any voluntary reduction in transparency. Companies with clean results and confident outlooks gain little from going dark and lose standing by doing so; the United Kingdom's base rates suggest most will not bother.⁵ The companies for which the calculus favors election are those for which scrutiny is most expensive—companies managing deteriorating trends they would prefer to describe twice a year rather than four times, companies whose disclosure obligations have become uncomfortable, companies for which three fewer certified filings means three fewer occasions on which omissions become actionable. The option is worth the most to precisely the issuers from whom investors most need frequent, disciplined disclosure. That is adverse selection in its textbook form, and it means the electing population will be systematically riskier than the general one.
The optionality also degrades the meaning of the default. Under the current regime, filing a 10-Q signals nothing, because everyone must. Under the proposed regime, continuing to file quarterly becomes a costly signal that clean companies must actively pay to send, while the election becomes one of the most informative governance disclosures available—comparable, in this firm's judgment, to an auditor resignation or a delayed filing, and deserving of the same analytical response.
The market's most sophisticated participants have already rendered their verdict. Opposition to the proposal has been voiced by Citadel, Fidelity, Two Sigma Investments, D.E. Shaw, and the Managed Funds Association—firms whose competitive existence depends on processing disclosure faster and better than anyone else, and which nonetheless want more of it rather than less.²⁶ When the parties best equipped to exploit an information-poor environment ask the Commission to preserve an information-rich one, the revealed preference deserves more weight than any comment letter's prose. The Commission's own Investor Advisory Committee convened on June 4, 2026 to weigh a potential recommendation on the question.²⁷ Chairman Atkins has framed the proposal as letting the market decide—but issuers are only half the market. The demand side has decided, and it is saying no.
First, file a comment letter before July 6, 2026, under File No. S7-2026-15, and concentrate on the two questions the Commission has already asked. If any version of the proposal is adopted, quarterly earnings releases issued by semiannual filers should be required to be filed rather than furnished, and their financial information should be subject to independent auditor review under standards equivalent to those governing Form 10-Q today.⁶ These two changes alone would close most of the accountability gap between the press release and the filing, and the Commission's solicitation of comment on both indicates that they are live possibilities rather than wishful thinking. Commenters should also press for the second-half breakout in Form 10-K on which the Commission has requested input, so that the third and fourth quarters of electing companies do not dissolve permanently into annual aggregates.⁸
Second, set the engagement standard now, before the first proxy season in which the checkbox appears. Any portfolio company electing semiannual reporting should be expected to publish the board's rationale for the election, confirm that the audit committee approved it, commit to quarterly earnings releases containing GAAP financial statements that have been reviewed by the independent auditor, maintain certification-equivalent representations from the chief executive and chief financial officers on interim information, and disclose how insider trading windows and Rule 10b5-1 arrangements have been re-anchored. A company unwilling to make those commitments has answered the only question that matters about why it elected.
Third, treat the election as a screening variable. In forensic terms, a semiannual election belongs in the same diagnostic family as an auditor change, a late filing, a chief financial officer departure, and a widening gap between non-GAAP and GAAP earnings: individually explicable, collectively damning. For hybrid reporters, the highest-yield analysis will be the systematic comparison of first- and third-quarter earnings releases against the reviewed figures that eventually surface in the Form 10-S and the Form 10-K. Discrepancies between what management volunteered in the unreviewed release and what survived the auditor's review will be the new restatement—quieter, but no less informative.
Fourth, vote like it matters. Where a semiannual election arrives alongside other disclosure-quality concerns, the appropriate response runs through the audit committee: votes against its members, and engagement that makes continued support contingent on the commitments described above. Reporting cadence is a board decision, and boards respond to consequences.
Fifth, price the darkness. The evidence that reporting frequency lowers the cost of equity capital implies its converse: companies that reduce frequency should expect to pay more for capital, through wider spreads, higher required returns, and lower multiples.²⁴ Institutional investors should make that repricing explicit in their models rather than waiting for the market to discover it episodically. An issuer that asks its owners to accept 204 days of statutory silence is asking for cheaper monitoring; the rational answer is more expensive capital.
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Referenced Sources:
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "SEC Proposes Amendments to Permit Optional Semiannual Reporting by Public Companies," Press Release No. 2026-42 (May 5, 2026).
Semiannual Reporting, Release Nos. 33-11414; 34-105368; 39-2563; IC-36140; File No. S7-2026-15 (May 5, 2026).
Id. (recounting the history of periodic reporting requirements, including the adoption of annual reporting in 1935, current reporting in 1936, quarterly revenue disclosure from 1946 to 1953, and the semiannual Form 9-K regime adopted in 1955).
Adoption of Form 10-Q, Rescission of Form 9-K and Amendment of Rules 13a-13 and 15d-13, Release No. 34-9004 (Oct. 28, 1970).
Jennifer L. Gaskin, "SEC Formally Proposes Making Quarterly Reporting Optional for Public Companies," Corporate Compliance Insights (May 6, 2026).
Deloitte, "SEC Proposes Optional Semiannual Reporting for Public Companies in Lieu of Quarterly Reporting," Heads Up (May 8, 2026).
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, "Half-Time Reports: The SEC's Proposed Play to Allow Semiannual Reporting for Public Companies" (May 2026).
Dorsey & Whitney LLP, "SEC Proposes Optional Semiannual Reporting for Public Companies Through New Form 10-S" (May 2026).
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Fact Sheet: Proposal to Allow Optional Semiannual Reporting" (May 5, 2026).
White & Case LLP, "SEC Proposes to Allow Semiannual Reporting for Domestic Issuers" (May 2026).
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, "SEC Proposes to Implement Optional Semiannual Reporting" (May 6, 2026).
Fenwick & West LLP, "SEC Proposal Would Permit Optional Semiannual Reporting on New Form 10-S and Simplify Financial Statement Staleness Rules" (May 2026).
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, "SEC Proposes Optional Semiannual Reporting for Public Companies" (May 2026).
CNBC, "Trump Advocates End to Quarterly Earnings Reports" (Sept. 15, 2025).
CNBC, "SEC to Propose Rule Change on Trump's Call to End Quarterly Earnings Reporting, Says Chair Atkins" (Sept. 19, 2025).
Thomson Reuters Tax & Accounting, "SEC to Revisit Semiannual Reporting After Trump's Call for Change" (Sept. 18, 2025).
"Jamie Dimon Throws Support Behind Changes to Quarterly Reporting," InvestmentNews (Oct. 8, 2025).
Matthew Kaplan, Paul Rodel, and Steven Slutzky (Debevoise & Plimpton LLP), "The End of Quarterly Reporting in the United States?," Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (Oct. 5, 2025); see also Request for Comment on Earnings Releases and Quarterly Reports, Release No. 33-10588 (Dec. 2018).
Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., "Optional Semiannual Reporting: SEC Proposes New Form 10-S and Related Rule Changes" (May 2026).
Arthur G. Kraft, Rahul Vashishtha, and Mohan Venkatachalam, "Frequent Financial Reporting and Managerial Myopia," The Accounting Review, Vol. 93, No. 2 (2018), pp. 249–275.
Frank Gigler, Chandra Kanodia, Haresh Sapra, and Raghu Venugopalan, "How Frequent Financial Reporting Can Cause Managerial Short-Termism: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Increasing Reporting Frequency," Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2014), pp. 357–387.
Robert C. Pozen, Suresh Nallareddy, and Shivaram Rajgopal, "Impact of Reporting Frequency on UK Public Companies," CFA Institute Research Foundation Briefs, Vol. 3, No. 1 (March 2017).
CFA Institute, "Study Examines the Impact of Reporting Frequency," Market Integrity Insights (May 23, 2017).
Renhui Fu, Arthur Kraft, and Huai Zhang, "Financial Reporting Frequency, Information Asymmetry, and the Cost of Equity," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (2012), pp. 132–149.
Reuters, "Buffett, Dimon Say Quarterly Profit Forecasts Harming Economy" (June 2018) (describing Jamie Dimon and Warren E. Buffett, "Short-Termism Is Harming the Economy," The Wall Street Journal (June 2018)).
Thomson Reuters Tax & Accounting, "SEC Proposes Optional Semiannual Reporting for Public Companies" (May 6, 2026).
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "SEC Investor Advisory Committee to Host June 4 Meeting," Press Release No. 2026-48 (May 2026).
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